In the digital camera market, Sony developed the Memory Stick card, which is only compatible with Sony's cameras. However, Kodak, Canon, Nikon, and HP all adopted the SD (Secure Digital) memory card. Despite the common practice of multiple standards, there is lack of knowledge on how technological compatibility affects consumer purchase decisions on base products and add-ons at the brand and/or standard level. We recognize the existence of multiple standards and develop a dynamic model in which a consumer makes periodic purchase decisions on whether to adopt/replace a base product and/or an add-on product. We take into account the dynamic and interactive inventory effect by allowing consumers to recognize the long-term financial implications when forward-planning in switching to a base product that is incompatible with the inventory of memory cards they have accumulated. Applying the model to consumer purchase history of digital cameras and memory cards from 2000 to 2004, we demonstrate compatibility makes consumer purchase decisions of base and addon products inter-temporally interdependent. Inventory of add-ons significantly affects purchases of base products. Our model explains the sales trends of the major brands of cameras and quantifies how much promotion to offer consumers in order to switch standards.
Introduction
Manufacturers are increasingly relying on selling accessories to raise profits. One natural method in technology markets is to target consumers who have purchased a "base product" (e.g. printer) with add-ons (e.g. toner for the printers) that function only with a given base product. Consequently, the natural linkage between base and add on products, particularly for technology goods, makes consumers' purchase/upgrade/replacement decisions regarding such products connected.
The add-on product market is non-trivial. For example, for consumer electronics products, buyers spent an average of 15 percent of the cost of a primary device on that device's accessories in 2006 as estimated by Consumer Electronics Association. 2 In the automobile industry, the market size of add-ons is $216 billion and it has been growing at an annual rate of 8 percent since 2000. 3 This large market is an appealing piece of the "profit" pie that all manufacturers track. Specifically, consumers tend to be less price sensitive toward add-on products, 4 which leads to a higher margin on add-ons. The inter-dependence between the base product and its add-ons has several interesting implications for manufacturers when they make dynamic marketing decisions for all products. Therefore, industry managers are enthusiastic to understand how to design add-on products in order to boost product line total sales.
Existing studies on cross-category purchases of durable goods are at a category level, without recognizing the existence of multiple standards that are regularly observed in practice. There is need to understand the impact of proprietary standards or incompatibility between base and add-on products on a consumer's purchase decisions of the base products and add-ons at the brands and standard level.
An understanding of consumer cross-category choices at the brand/standard level sheds light on why , major camera manufacturers compete indirectly in the memory card market by creating incompatible standards and why Sony chooses to remain separate while others choose to unite.
In this paper, we evaluate the dynamic impact of add-on products on a consumer choice of base products by deconstructing the impact into the following key issues: First, how or whether prices of add-ons of one standard affect consumer choice of base products at the brand level. Second, how or whether inventory of add-ons affects purchase of compatible and non-compatible base products; in other words, does a compatibility requirement of add-on products create a cost of switching that locks consumers in to the compatible base product brand? If so, what is the monetary equivalent for the consumers to switch to a non-compatible brand? Third, is it a good strategy to leverage the switching cost created by incompatibility of add-ons with base products? Specifically, did Sony gain from developing its proprietary standard of memory card, the Memory Stick?
We develop a framework in which forward-looking consumers make joint brand choice decisions regarding the base product and the add-on when several base product brands are compatible with only one of the several standards of add-on products. Our model assumes sophisticated consumers take into account price and quality trajectories of add-on products when purchasing a base product. For instance, if the consumer is faced with an attractive base product that are lowly priced but add-ons that are highly priced, the consumer will anticipate the potential burden of purchasing expensive add-on products (Gabaix and Liabson 2006) , thus perhaps avoiding the base product.
Forward-looking consumers analyze the total cost of the bundle (the price of the base product and the expected cost of all add-ons), not just the price of each component. Our model also allows a consumer to account for his existing utility associated with his compatible base product and inventory of add-ons.
This model allows us to approximate the interesting dynamic decision process regarding interdependent purchases of base products and add-ons: When choosing among camera brands with compatibility concerns, consumers take into account the accumulated compatible add-ons at hand and , compare the stream of future consumption utility from the pre-owned memory cards and dis-utilities of having to purchase compatible memory cards in the future, which we term as dynamic inventory effect.
In this setting, compatibility is the key link between the purchase decisions of the base product and the add-on. The brand level compatibility further adds interesting consumer choice dynamics.
We find empirical evidence of a strong "add-on-to-base effect" between a camera and memory cards caused by compatibility-a memory card in inventory can add to the utility of a compatible camera. Also, we find that a consumer is locked-in by the utility compatible add-ons provide. In addition to the finding that consumers' purchase decisions of base products is influenced by the expected price of the add-on product, we show that the add-on-to-base effect is enhanced when future prices of add-ons are lower. More specifically, when the expected future price of a memory card decreases, the purchase probability of the compatible camera increases given the same amount of addons purchased before. In addition, we find the cost for rival firms to steal Sony consumers is larger ($23.055 and $15.196 ) than for Sony to steal the consumers of competing firms ($8.482 ).
We also run simulation to study the change of sales under four alternative compatibility policies.
We find that, 1) when incompatibility is removed among standards, the manufacturer of a premium memory card cannot reap the profit from camera transactions. For instance, if Sony did not create its proprietary memory card standard, its camera's market share would have been reduced by 6 percentage points. 2) When adopting an adapter that makes their cameras compatible with the memory cards of Sony's, the sales of Standard 3 cameras increase significantly. 3) When manufacturers of Standard 2 cameras lower their camera prices during the initial periods, they benefit more from the dynamic addon-to-base effect and increase sales by about 20%. 4) When Sony's brand equity falls below the industry average, incompatibility damages Sony's market share.
We contribute to the literature on cross-category purchases of durable goods in the following way: First, our model recognizes the existence of multiple incompatible standards and models consumer brand choices of base and add-on products. This differs from prior literature that examines consumer purchases of base and add-on products at the category level. In addition, existing literature includes a time-invariant constant complementary term to take into account the inter-dependence between products (Sriram, Chintagunta and Agarwal 2009). We allow forward-looking consumers to endogenize the purchase quantity of memory cards and to consider the inventory of their memory cards when determining the purchase of base products and add-ons. In summary, in addition to incorporating inter-temporal trade-offs regarding inter-temporal pricing effect for the base product as in the existing literature, our model takes into account two new inter-temporal effects (i) a crosscategory pricing effect and (ii) the cross-category inventory effect. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to incorporate these effects simultaneously and evaluate how consumers respond to the purchases of base products and add-ons when multiple standards exist.
Literature Review
Our paper stems from three streams of literature: durable goods adoption and replacement decisionmaking; multi-category purchase analysis; and compatibility. Recent years have seen an increase in research on empirical examination of durable goods adoption and replacement decision-making. This stream of research focuses on how consumers take the price and quality evolvement process into account to make long-term purchase decisions. For example, Melnikov (2001) constructs a dynamic model that describes consumers' adoption of differentiated durable products as an optimal stopping problem. By utilizing data from the U.S. computer printer market, the author finds evidence of forward-looking behavior. Song and Chintagunta (2003) models adoption process of digital cameras, accounting for both consumer heterogeneity and forward-looking behavior. Applying this model to aggregate data in the digital camera category from 1996 to 1999, the authors find that Sony's entry , effects can be decomposed into a market expansion and brand switching effects. Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007) build a dynamic model of consumer preferences with heterogeneity, rational expectation of future products and repeat purchases over time. Nair (2007) studies the optimal pricing strategy for a firm to sell video-games to forward-looking consumers who strategically delay purchase to benefit from lower prices in the future. Gordon (2009) models both product adoption and replacement process.
Using aggregate data in the PC processor industry together with micro-level survey data, the author infers ownership and replacement behavior. The paper reveals substantial variation in replacement cycles with consumers' forward-looking behavior and heterogeneity. However, this stream of research focuses on single product category and does not examine multi-category purchases.
Recently, there have emerged a few papers investigating the complementarity relationship between a base product and some add-on components. Seetharaman et al. (2005) provides an excellent review of models of multi-category choice behavior, including three outcomes: purchase incidence, brand choice, and quantity consideration. Sriram, Chintagunta and Agarwal (2009) present a framework for measuring complementarity effect across personal computers, digital cameras, and printers. The complementarity term captures the additional per-period utility that the consumer derives from owning products from both categories. Gentzkow (2007) as well as Liu, Chintagunta and Zhu (2010) develop similar models to identify the complementarity term, which is modeled as a constant synergy coefficient times an indicator that takes a value of one when a consumer purchases in both categories and zero otherwise. Constrained by data, none of them have fully discovered the dynamic impact of one category on the other. In the interesting work by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , the joint decisions of a focal product and its add-on are studied by relaxing the rational expectation assumption. Assuming a heterogeneous discounting factor (hyperbolic discounting), they show that in managing high-tech products (e.g., printers) with add-ons (e.g., toner), firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons. Though recognizing the complementary relationship , between base products and their add-ons, these models use a time-invariant constant term to capture the relationship. Our paper takes a different perspective. We design a more intuitive model where the cross-category dependence relies on compatibility of base products and add-ons. We further look at how consumers' forward-looking tendency determines their purchase sequence of base products and add-ons. The cross-category dynamic influence is our emphasis.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the compatibility problem of base products and add-ons. Standard economics literature claims that if products are incompatible, switching costs bind customers to vendors. Such not only involves direct efficiency losses but also softens competition and magnifies incumbency advantages (see Farrell and Klemperer (2005) for a good review). Therefore, consumers as well as economists favor compatibility, or in other words standardization (see Farrell and Simcoe (2012) for benefits of compatibility). However, on the supply side, firms have incentives to create incompatibility constraints. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) used a "mix and match" model to show that compatibility leads to higher pricing. Katz and Shapiro (1985) found that firms with good reputations or large existing networks tended to be against compatibility while firms with weak reputation tended to favor product compatibility. There is also a large body of marketing literature focused on compatibility with network externality. However, our paper does not consider this network effect.
Industry Background and Data Description
As digital cameras began taking higher quality pictures, consumers demanded larger storage devices on which to save photos. In the early 1990's, the PC Card (PCMCIA) was the first commercial memory card format. It was followed by CompactFlash, SmartMedia, and Miniature Card.
Accompanying Sony's first digital camera in the market was a 3.5" floppy disk storage device. . Therefore, during our observation period, we assume no introduction of new formats and hence the choice set of consumers is identical throughout time. products as going up, they will switch brands in the base product category to minimize the total financial burden of the product portfolio.
Data Description

Add-on-to-base Effect
[Insert Figure 3 about Here]
In addition to the above memory price effects on camera purchase incidence, perhaps inventory of memory cards (our add-on-to-base effect) also plays an important role in camera purchases. We assume memory cards do not become obsolete, and with this a consumer who owns a memory card should be more reluctant to switch to a camera that is incompatible with her existing stock of memory inventory.
On the other hand, a consumer who has zero stock of memory card inventory is not as relatively "locked-in" to a particular camera brand than the previous consumer type. Figure 3 illustrates the purchase incidences for each camera brand conditional on consumer inventory levels of compatible memory cards. We see that for all camera brands, purchase incidence increases as inventory levels of compatible memory cards increase. This is particularly true for Sony where it appears a Sony consumer is locked-in and perhaps faces higher switching costs or add-on-to-base effects associated with existing memory card inventory than consumers who own other standards.
In summary, the data pattern shows the inter-temporal interdependence between purchases of base and add-on products. It is evident that forward-planning consumers take into account the financial , implications of discarding their existing add-ons when comparing long-term utilities of alternative choice sequences. In the next session, we develop a model to explicitly describe this decision process.
Model
Assumption
Consumer purchase behavior of high-tech and durable goods is distinguished from that of fast-moving goods on several fronts. First, prices of technology products decline while quality improves over time.
Thus, a model of consumer adoption of products needs to account for the fact consumers anticipate these future price and quality trajectories while deciding when to purchase. Second, since products are durable in nature and add-on products can be purchased subsequently, consumers tend to look into the future when making purchasing decisions. Finally, the forward-looking behavior of consumers and the issue of compatibility between camera and memory card imply that a consumer's decision of purchasing the base product is likely to depend on when she anticipates the purchase of the add-on products.
Therefore, the purchase decision for the base product would depend not only on the expected price and quality trajectories of that product, but also on the anticipated price and quality of the add-on product. To approximate this decision calculus, we develop a model of consumer purchase (adoption and replacement) decisions of base products and add-ons as a dynamic optimization problem under price and quality uncertainty.
In light of the data on hand and the specific industry we study, we make several assumptions regarding consumer behavior for model parsimony. First, we assume consumers can buy only at the focal store. This assumption may seem quite restrictive as consumers sometimes purchase at several electronic stores. However, this concern is mitigated because all households in our sample are holders of loyalty cards and most of them have purchased at least one camera during the observation period.
Next we treat a consumer who buys multiple cameras or memory cards on a single trip as only one purchase incidence. This assumption is reasonable because only a very small portion (0.6%) of the purchases in our sample involves multiple items. Third, we assume there is no resale market for cameras and a discarded camera cannot be exchanged for its residual value. This implicitly assumes consumers only derive utility from their most recently purchased camera.
Consumer Choices and Flow Utility
Assume the consumer ( = 1,2, … , ) makes purchase decisions of both the base product (camera ) and the add-on (memory ) jointly at time period ( = 1,2, . . , ). There are multiple brands of cameras and multiple standards of memory cards to choose from. We denote a consumer's choice of both product categories as a pair ( , ) in which the base product is ( ∈ 0,1,2, … , ), where 0 denotes no purchase, and is the total number of camera brands. The choice of the add-on product is
, where again 0 denotes no purchase and is the total number of memory card standards. In our data, = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 represents Sony, Olympus, Fujifilm, Kodak, Canon, HP
and Nikon respectively while = 1,2,3 corresponds to Standard 1 (Memory Stick), Standard 2 (SmartMedia/xD card), Standard 3 (CompactFlash/SD card) respectively. Thus, during each time period, a consumer faces four types of choice alternatives: (1) purchase (adopt or replace) a camera of brand only, (2) purchase a memory card of standard only, (3) purchase one camera and one memory card together and (4) purchase neither product. There are altogether 18 choice alternatives.
Our model follows the large literature pertaining to choice models (Guadagni and Little 1983) and assumes the per-period utility function can be decomposed into a deterministic part and an idiosyncratic error term.
Superscripts of and denote choice of camera and memory card . We now discuss in detail the deterministic components of the four different choice alternatives.
,
Case 1: Purchase Camera Only
When a consumer buys only a camera, she can derive utility from the attributes of the camera, summarized by the brand-specific constant and quality. She also pays a price to purchase the camera.
Moreover, she can enjoy consumption utility from using the compatible memory cards in inventory for storing pictures. The utility function for purchasing a camera and no memory cards takes the form:
for all ∈ 0,1,2, … , . The first term $ in (2) is the brand-specific fixed effect, which comprises any intrinsic utility of purchasing camera of brand . & is the quality of the camera , which is measured by megapixels in our data set. Its coefficient % is the marginal utility for a single unit of quality increment.
The third term captures the inventory effect of compatible memory cards at hand. Because memory cards in inventory can be used to store photos and multiple memory cards provide convenience and flexibility, consumers still derive utilities from them. Indicator ( ~ ) denotes that only compatible memory cards can enhance the utility of a camera. From the data description section we know that ( = 1)~( = 1); ( = 2,3)~( = 2); ( = 4,5,6,7)~( = 3).
In order to account for the fact that all previously purchased compatible memory cards adds to the utility of a compatible camera we multiply the indicator ( ~ ) by the term *+ which is the inventory of memory card at time hold by consumer . The coefficient ( measures the marginal utility one compatible memory card in inventory can add to the purchased camera. We name the coefficient ( as "add-on-to-base effect". If a consumer decides to purchase a camera incompatible with the memory cards in inventory, she chooses to let the memory cards in inventory go obsolete. The fourth term of Equation (2) represents the price effect, with 0 as price for camera of brand and coefficient / as the price sensitivity.
Case 2: Purchase Memory Only
When a consumer buys only a memory card, she obtains utility from consuming the memory card and using it as storage for the compatible camera she possesses. Thus, the utility function takes the form:
The first two terms in equation Error! Reference source not found. consist of the utility associated with the physical characteristics of memory, where 2 is the standard-specific fixed effect of memory card , & is the quality of the memory card measured by megabytes and its coefficient % measures consumer 's sensitivity to quality or storage capacity. 0 is the price of memory card and / denotes price sensitivity.
Case 3: Camera & Memory
Assuming the purchased camera is compatible with the memory card (no consumer purchased incompatible base product and add-on at the same time in our data), when a consumer simultaneously purchases camera and memory card the utility function is a combination of those in the previous two cases. If a consumer does not own a camera and she decides not to make a purchase of any product at time t, we normalize the utility to zero. That is,
Moreover, we assume when purchasing only a memory card, consumers simply determine whether the net utility is greater than zero, not the sum of all memory cards at hand. Thus, the no purchase utility associated with only memory is also normalized to zero. This is due to the manner in which we treat memory cards: while cameras are upgraded and replaced, memory cards are not.
However, if a consumer owns a camera and decides not to replace it with a new one, she continues to receive utility from the camera and the compatible memory cards in inventory (if there is any) without paying additional cost. Thus, the utility function has two components: possession of a camera, and the add-on-to-base effect provided by inventory of compatible memory cards. Consequently, the per period utility for a consumer who owns a camera and/or memory cards is 
We determine the utility of the outside option with a "reduce form" approximation. Ideally, we would include the gross utility of the camera or memory in inventory. Instead we capture the utility of a camera with the parameter 5 , which is not camera-specific, and memory utility with parameter ( , which is standard-specific due to the computational complexity associated with tracking which brand and quality camera a consumer holds in inventory as well as the memory card standard and its quality.
Implementation of a more precise specification would increase the state space from 590513 to 4.7890e+052 generating even more of a computational burden than the specified model. 11 We therefore approximate the outside option but realize that doing so incorporates a slight bias in our parameter estimates from a model that more precisely tracks memory and camera utility. Utility functions for each of the 18 choice alternatives are shown in Table A1 of the Appendix. In summary, this specification demonstrates the fact that a consumer's existing product represents her state-specific outside option.
The utility of the outside option is a function of endogenously determined past choice. Lastly, we assume the error term associated with each of the above deterministic components of utility above is " 9 , and is independent and identically distributed with the Type I Extreme Value.
Note the memory inventory term links a consumer purchase decision of a camera and that of memory cards into a single framework, i.e., a forward-looking consumer who makes a purchase decision of a camera at time t will consider not only the extra utility generated by the compatible memory cards in inventory, but also the effect of future price and quality of the memory cards. Without this term, the purchase decisions of the two categories will be separated as in most existing literature with the exception of Sriram, Chintagunta and Agarwal (2009) and Liu, Chintagunta and Zhu (2010) in which the complementarity between the two categories is captured by a time-invariant term in the utility function.
Our approach is fundamentally different from existing literature on cross-category purchases of durable goods for the following reasons: First, we recognize the compatibility at the brand (for camera) and standard level (for memory cards). This allows us to study how brand choices of base products are driven by past, current, and future choices of standard of the add-on products. Second, we allow the add-on-to-base effect to depend on the number and quality of the add-on products owned. Therefore, the add-on-to-base effect can vary across time and affect the inter-temporal decision-making of forward-looking consumers--since the more compatible memory cards accumulated, the higher the per-11 With our current specification, the estimation procedure takes around 140 hours on an Intel Core i7-2640M PC.
period add-on-to-base effect. This implies that the accumulation of add-on products creates a higher cost of switching for consumers to abandon the compatible base product. This allows us to provide some explanation on the observation of consumers latching on to a particular brand of camera.
State Transitions
Inventory Process According to our assumptions above, a consumer uses only the latest purchased camera. So when camera is purchased at time , its inventory becomes 1. When no camera is purchased at time , the inventory for each brand remains the same as in the last period. And if a different camera ′ is purchased, the inventory of camera is reset to zero because it is replaced by the new camera.
So the inventory process for camera is (after dropping the consumer index )
where ? , . is the indicator of consumer's choice, with ? , . = 1 meaning the consumer purchasing brand ( = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7) as the base product and any memory card (including no purchase) as addon product. *+ is the beginning inventory of camera at time .
On the other hand, since memory cards do not become obsolete, the inventory process of memory cards is the purchases accumulated through time.
*+ :. = *+ + ?
. ,
Where *+ is the beginning inventory of memory card at time and ? . , is new purchase during period . If no purchase is made at time , ? . , = 0. This process is in contrast to that of fastmoving packaged goods, for which inventory is cumulative purchases minus consumption throughout time. The transition matrix of inventory process from period to period +1 for the 18 choice options is shown in Table A2 of Appendix 1.
Price and Quality Process
We assume that consumers have rational expectations about the stochastic processes governing the evolution of price and quality, which follow a first-order Markov process. We also take into account competitive reaction. Thus, are random price shocks of brand ( ) at time and Z`Q u (^`v Q v ) are random quality shocks of brand ( ) at time . We assume random shocks in prices of all ( ) brands, Z Q (^Q), follow a multivariate normal distribution:
The diagonal elements in Σ xj ( Σ yj , Σ xm , Σ ym ) denote the corresponding variance of Z VQ (^V Q , Z`Q,^`Q) and the off-diagonal elements denote the covariance between prices (qualities) of different brands. Allowing random shocks to be correlated can further capture the co-movement of prices (qualities) of the competing brands. The price (quality) process parameters are estimated using the price (quality) data prior to the estimation of the model. They are then treated as known in the model estimation when we solve the consumer's dynamic optimization problem.
Notice here that our assumption of rational expectation is strong. In reality, prices (qualities) are endogenously determined by the interaction of firms and consumer demands. As we do not have firm level data, we make the assumption that prices (qualities) are exogenously set by firms, and consumers are able to rationally anticipate the price (quality) trajectories based on historical prices (qualities) of the focal firm and all competitors.
Dynamic Optimization Problem and Inter-temporal Tradeoffs
Given the base products and add-ons are durable in nature, we follow the standard literature and assume the objective of the consumer is to maximize the expected present value of utility over the (finite) planning horizon = 1,2, … , 
with letters in bold denoting vectors of all choice alternatives.
The timing of a representative consumer's decision is as follows. A consumer in the model makes purchase decisions for both base products and add-ons. She can choose cameras of seven different brand groups and three compatible standards of memory cards. The adoption behavior of a camera and a memory card may be at the same time or in a sequential order. A typical purchase pattern is that a consumer first buys a camera and in a later period, she hopes to enhance functionality of the camera, thus purchasing a memory card for greater storage space. The trade-off for consumers in this adoption period is two-fold. First, when she chooses between standards of memory cards, some standards are of high quality at the expense of high price while others are mediocre but less expensive.
Second, a consumer has to decide whether to adopt early or late. An early adopter of either base products or add-ons sacrifices the high prices soon after product launch to gain the stream of consumption utilities in the product life cycle, whereas a late adopter strategically waits for prices to decline. The state variables that determine a consumer's choice are expected prices of base products and add-ons and their quality. After some time, new products (e.g. a camera with more pixel counts or a ‫ﲐ‬қ memory card of larger size) are introduced to the market, and the consumer becomes tired of using the old camera and looks to upgrade her camera. The state variables in her consideration set now include price, quality as well as inventory of cameras and memory cards at hand. The choice alternatives with respect to the base product for her are (1) buy only a new camera of the same standard (2) switch to another brand of camera. For the first alternative, she not only gains utility from the new camera itself, but also she can continue using the memory card previously purchased. This add-on-to-base effect can justify a consumer's choice to stay with the existing standard; i.e. a consumer is locked-in by the addons. In other words, the willingness to continue using the add-on products creates a switching cost for consumers. In contrast, if a consumer finds another standard sufficiently attractive, she could forgo the inventory of all memory cards and start with the new standard. She makes this switching behavior because the competitor's camera/memory card bundle provides higher total present value (discounted future values) for her. For example, a competitor's camera could be of high quality, or a competitor develops a memory card of larger storage, or she anticipates price of a competitor's memory card will drop rapidly, etc.
The choice alternatives with respect to the add-on product are (1) add one more add-on product compatible with the base product on hand to enhance usability and (2) stay with the current inventory. As we can see here, consumers face tradeoffs in both the price (adjusted by quality) dimension and the inventory dimension. The former tradeoff implies a sophisticated consumer take into account price trajectories of add-on products when purchasing a base product. Even if facing an attractive base product with a lower price, the consumer will anticipate the potential high burden of purchasing add-on products (Gabaix and Laibson 2006) , thus avoiding it. So a consumer needs to sacrifice the price loss of base products to achieve an optimal strategy of purchasing the whole bundle if the add-on prices are sufficiently lower. Whereas the latter tradeoff implies that, a standard switcher sacrifices the utilities provided by compatibility of the existing base product and add-ons to obtain ‫ﲐ‬қ higher net utility from the other brand. On the other hand, a loyal consumer sacrifices higher net utility from other standards to maintain continuous utility from previously purchased add-ons; in other words, she would be locked in by the add-ons. In summary, our model incorporates trade-offs regarding ownproduct inter-temporal price and quality effect, cross-category price and quality effect and crosscategory dynamic inventory effect. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study these three effects at the same time.
Heterogeneity, Initial Value, and Identification and Estimation
We adopt the latent class approach (Kamakura and Russell 1989) to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity for quality preference, add-on-to-base effect, and price sensitivity.
Inventory of camera and memory card is an important state variable that plays a role in a consumer's decision process. As our sample starts in late 1998, we do not know the purchase history of consumers before this time, which gives rise to an initial condition problem. Fortunately, we know that the first series of digital cameras for the consumer-level market was launched after 1994. According to the dataset of dpreview.com 12 , only 17 models of camera were launched before 1998. Therefore, at the beginning of our sample period, very few consumers could have adopted cameras. We carefully examine the data for the first two purchase occasions. For consumers who buy memory cards first and an incompatible camera in a subsequent purchase occasion, we assume they adopted a compatible camera before the start of the observation period. These consumers amount to roughly 1.09% of the total sample. Specifically, we randomly assign a compatible camera purchase to one of the five periods and in the case where multiple brands of cameras are compatible for a certain standard of memory card we randomly assign a brand. Further, we use the first five quarters (1998 4 th quarter to 1999 4 th quarter)
as a training period to determine consumers' initial inventory level. Needless to say the concern from an initial condition problem is minimal and we have attempted to minimize its effect.
The maximization of (10) is accomplished by choosing the optimal sequence of control variables OE? , • for ∈ 0,1, … , , ∈ 1,2, … , and Ž ∈ 1,2, … , . Define the maximum expected value of discounted lifetime utility as
The value function • depends on the state at . Given takes values from an interval of finite length, the value function can be written as
Based on the Bellman equation (Bellman 1957 ),
at time T, the choice-specific value function is simply • … , (Ω … ) = ƒ … , + " … , . We assume the error terms are iid Gumble. The choice probability for consumer to choose alternative ( , ) at time has a closed-form solution:
, is the deterministic part of the choice-specific value function, i.e.
• " … , = • , − " , .
The corresponding log-likelihood function to be maximized is
To estimate the dynamic model, we follow the convention and fix the discount factor • at 0.95, same for all consumers. Given there are 8 dimensions of state variables we encounter the problem of a large state space. We adopt the interpolation method developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) and calculate the value functions at a subset of the state space, and then use these values to estimate the coefficients of an interpolation regression to correct for such a problem. More specifically, we draw 100 state-space points and adopt a linear interpolation function of the state variables. Next, we use the interpolation regression function to provide values for the expected maxima at any other state points for which values are needed in the backward recursion solution process. We also assume the planning horizon is 35 quarters (≈8.75 years, 1.75 times longer than our observation period).
Results and Discussion
Model Comparison
To evaluate the importance of incorporating the dynamic add-on-to-base effect, we compare the data fitting performance of our proposed model with several alternative benchmark models. The first benchmark model assumes zero discount factor, no add-on-to-base effect, and homogeneous consumers. This is a myopic model, in which homogenous consumers are assumed to make independent purchase decisions of base and add-ons to maximize current utility--consumers do not consider the inter-temporal dependence between base product and add-ons. The second model adds to the first benchmark model forward-looking consumers. Even though customers are allowed to take into account future trends of prices and quality, their purchases of base product and add-ons are ‫ﲐ‬қ assumed to be independent since this model does not recognize compatibility. The third benchmark model adds the add-on-to-base effect but assumes it is a constant. This model is similar to Sriram, Chintagunta and Agarwal's (2009) estimated model. We replace our add-on-to-base effect term, which is a function of memory inventory, with a constant. It is important to note this model implicitly assumes that the add-on and base products are not required to be purchased simultaneously like that of Sriram et. al. for consumers to recover the constant term. The fourth benchmark model is the aforementioned model without heterogeneous consumers. The fifth model adds heterogeneous consumers and is our proposed model.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
We estimate our proposed model with one to four segments. Comparison of BIC suggests the two-segment model is the most preferred and that of AIC suggests the three-segment model. For ease of interpretation, we pick the two-segment model as our proposed model and report model performance of the two-segment model in the following discussion. Table 4 presents the log-likelihood, AIC and BIC of the five alternative models. All of our dynamic models (Models 2-5) outperform the myopic model (Model 1). This implies dynamic models have an advantage in explaining data that an inherently dynamic process generates. Similarly, models recognizing the add-on-to-base effect (Models 3-5) outperform the ones that treat purchase decisions of base products and add-ons independently (Models 1 and 2). AIC and BIC further improve when we replace the constant add-on-to-base effect in Model 3 with cumulative inventory term of memory cards in Model 4. It shows that a model taking into account all previously purchased memory cards better approximate the dynamic decision process of making a new camera replacement decision. In Table 5 , we report the estimated coefficients for the proposed model. All the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The intercept terms represent consumer intrinsic preference for the seven brands of camera and three standards of memory cards. Comparison of these intercepts reflects the relative attractiveness of different brands within each category, after accounting for the other factors included in the utility function. For example, consumers in segment 1 prefer Sony and Olympus, followed by Kodak, Canon, Fuji, Nikon, and HP in sequential order for cameras and Standard 3, Standard 2, and Standard 1 for memory cards. However, the preference order is Sony, Nikon, Kodak, Olympus, Canon, HP, and Fuji for cameras and Standard 2, Standard 3, and Standard 1 for memory cards for segment 2 consumers.
Parameter Estimates ‫ﲐ‬қ
The coefficients of quality for camera and memory cards are both positive for both segments, implying consumers care about the quality of the products. Not surprisingly, the coefficients of camera inventory are positive for both segments, which suggests consumers are more likely to purchase memory cards compatible with the camera they have in hand. As expected, the price coefficient is estimated to be negative, showing consumers are price sensitive to the base and add-on products.
For all consumers, there is a significant add-on-to-base effect for all three standards of memory cards. This confirms our conjecture that consumers with a higher number of memory cards accumulated in the inventory display a higher probability of purchasing a camera that is compatible with the memory cards. It is interesting to compare the magnitude of add-on-to-base effect across standards. The add-on-to-base effect is highest for Standard 1, followed by Standard 3, and Standard 2 has the lowest effect. This implies that consumers value their previously purchased Sony memory cards most. Given everything else equally, an owner of Sony memory cards is much more likely to purchase another Sony camera, evident from Table 3 , which presents a consumer's probability of switching standards. More generally, the larger the add-on-to-base effect, the greater the cost of switching to a new standard the consumer faces.
Comparing the estimates across the two segments, we find segment 1 consumers are defined more by higher price sensitivity (-1.904 vs -0.487) and low quality sensitivity (0.428 vs. 1.122 for camera and 0.111 vs. 1.488 for memory card). Consumers in segment 2 are characterized as being sensitive to quality but less sensitive to price. For the remainder of the discussion, we refer to the first segment as the price-sensitive segment and the second segment as the quality-sensitive segment. The price-sensitive segment constitutes the majority of the population (91.7%). Interestingly, price-sensitive consumers are found to have higher add-on-to-base effects. This is not surprising because price-sensitive consumers are relatively more concerned about the future financial burden of purchasing memory cards. Thus, they value more the memory cards in inventory.
Dynamic Add-on-to-Base Effect and Interaction with Future Prices of Add-ons
[Insert Figure 4 about Here] Figure 4 characterizes a consumer decision rule describing how forward-looking consumers make a dynamic choice of base products based on current inventory and the expected future price sequence of compatible memory cards. Purchase probability of the compatible camera increases with inventory of compatible memory cards. This is because when planning her purchase sequence in the future, a consumer with higher inventory of memory cards, and thus extra storage space already in possession, not only enjoys a long-term consumption utility stream, but also avoids a stream of future spending on new memory cards. This is the dynamic add-on-to-base effect captured by our model. Interestingly, the dynamic add-on effect is most prominent for Standard 1 (Sony's) and Standard 3 cameras, in the sense that the purchase probability increases faster for the same amount of accumulation in memory card inventory. This is because when compared with those of Standard 2, ‫ﲐ‬қ Sony's memory card offers a higher consumption utility stream while Standard 3 memory cards offer lower financial commitment. This implies that switching to an incompatible camera means not only incurring a purchase price, but also a loss of long-term consumption utility as well as a future of purchasing additional memory cards of another standard. Figure 4 also presents how a current purchase decision of a camera is driven by the future price trend of compatible memory cards. As expected, for all brands, when the expected future price of a memory card decreases, the purchase probability of the compatible camera increases because the financial commitment related to the planned purchase sequence for owning a composite of camera and memory card(s) is lower compared with other brand bundles.
It is interesting to discuss how the future price expectations interact with the aggregate dynamic add-on-to-base effect. The model determines and we illustrate in Figure 4 that the add-on-to-base effect becomes more prominent when consumers expect future prices of compatible memory cards to be lower. This is because when expecting lower future prices of memory cards, consumers holding the same amount of memory cards in inventory can save more financial resources when purchasing new memory cards in the future, thus making them even more likely to purchase the compatible camera. Put in other words, the lower future prices of memory cards can enhance the dynamic add-on-to-base effect for the compatible camera. Note, the interactive effect between the how inventory and price affect purchase probability cannot be easily captured by reduced form models.
Quantify Purchase "Lock-In" due to Compatibility
Our dynamic model allows us to quantify the cost of switching consumers to an incompatible camera when they have different inventory levels of memory cards. Our definition of the cost of switching is the minimum lump-sum payment that a manufacturer needs in order to compensate a consumer to get her to switch to its brand of camera. As the consumer is forward-looking, this cost of switching measures the difference between total discounted values of two streams of utilities stemmed from purchasing two different cameras. More specifically, it is the difference between the continuation value of purchasing a compatible camera and the continuation value of switching to an incompatible brand divided by the price sensitivity coefficient. Given our way of defining the cost of switching, it is time and state-dependent. Thus, we arbitrarily selected period ten, with which we calculated the monetary equivalent of switching using the scenario of one representative consumer who has one compatible memory card in inventory during this period.
[Insert Table 6 about Here]
We report the monetary value of the cost of switching for the two segments as well as for the three brand groups in Table 6 From the above comparison, we see that Sony (the first row) has the highest cost of switching.
This means that for the same amount of inventory of memory cards, it is more costly to attract consumers from Sony to other brands than vice versa. Thus, Sony enjoys the highest rates of "lock-in" or loyalty because of the incompatibility: consumers tend to stick with the same standard, or choose the brand names that are compatible with their inventories of memory cards. It is followed by Standard 3 cameras. This can be explained by the higher dynamic add-on-to-base effect modified by the price expectation: having the same amount of memory cards on hand, Sony owners enjoy higher total discounted future consumption utility from purchasing a compatible camera than purchasing a noncompatible camera (the coefficient of add-on-to-base effect is highest for Sony). However, this is mitigated by the higher expected future financial commitment in purchasing new memory cards because we have shown that higher future prices lower the dynamic add-on-to-base effect. By this means, the introduction of the Memory Stick assists Sony in building strong brand loyalty because consumers are tied to the standard by a high cost of switching. When product replacement becomes more frequent as product quality improves over time, such lock-in effect creates continuous sales for Sony.
The comparison of switching costs also indicates that it takes nearly double the amount of discount to coerce consumers to switch from Standard 3 cameras than from Standard 2 cameras. This is not only because Standard 3 cameras have higher -base effect, but also because the future prices of Standard 3 memory cards are lower than those of Standard 2 cameras. This enhances the dynamic addon-to-base effect and competitiveness of Standard 3 cameras, which is not as high as that enjoyed by Sony.
We also notice (present in Table 6 ) the cost of switching is higher among consumers in segment 1 (price-sensitive consumers) than consumers in segment 2 (quality-sensitive consumers). Recall that price-sensitive consumers also have larger add-on-to-base effects and thus have the most utility to lose by eliminating their current memory card inventory when switching standards.
Price Elasticity
Unlike those in the existing literature, our model is built at the brand and standard choice level, allowing us to examine how price affects brand or standard switching decisions. In addition, our model takes into account the inter-temporal dependence of base and add-on products, permitting us to study how price affects brand or standard switching across categories. In Table 7 , we report the percentage changes in sales when the price increases by 10% for both camera brands and memory standards. There are many notable results; however, we focus on the most interesting ones related to cross-category elasticities.
[Insert Table 7 about Here] First, it is interesting to note that own-category price effect dominates cross-category price effect for all brands with the exception of Sony. When the price of Sony memory chips increases by 10%, purchase probability of the Sony camera decreases by 12.10%. With the same 10% increase in the price of the Sony camera, however, purchase probability of Sony camera decreases only by 9.74%. In other words, the change of purchase probability for the Sony camera decreases more when the price of the compatible Standard 1 memory card decreases than when its own price decreases. This is because the high price charged by Sony for its memory card prevents consumers from purchasing more memory cards, thus eroding the dynamic add-on-to-base effect to a point that consumers become highly sensitized to the price of memory cards.
Furthermore, when examining the cross-category elasticities listed in the last three columns, we find that when the price of a Standard 1 or 2 memory card increases, most sales transfer to Standard 3 cameras. For example, when Sony increases the price of its memory card the sales of Standard 3 cameras (Canon, HP and Kodak) increase more than those of Olympus and Fuji. Similarly, when the price of a Standard 2 memory card increases by 10% the sales of Standard 3 cameras also increase more than Sony. This means that charging higher prices for memory cards drives consumers to a more open standard in which more cameras can share the same memory card. It is also important to note that competition among camera brands is most fierce within standards.
Policy Simulations
We calibrated our dynamic model in order to conduct counterfactual analysis to examine the following research questions: 1) How does the market change when we eliminate compatibility constraints? 2)
What if the inferior standard tries to be compatible with the superior standard? 3) Can a firm improve its market position by adopting a pricing strategy to take more advantage of the add-on-to-base effect? 4) Is incompatibility design beneficial for all firms?
Compatibility
To investigate the implication of compatibility, we carry out a simulation wherein we estimate average choice probabilities of cameras and memory cards of different standards when the add-on-to-base effect exists regardless of standards. For instance, a previously purchased Sony Memory Stick can be used on any newly purchased cameras from Olympus, Fujifilm, Kodak, Canon, HP, and Nikon in addition to Sony. Thus, all memory cards in inventory will exert the add-on-to-base effect to the purchased camera, though in various magnitudes determined by the coefficient of add-on-to-baseeffect. To approximate this scenario, we set the standard-specific add-on-to-base effect to be the sum of inventory of all memory cards as if no compatibility constraints exist across standards.
[Insert Table 8 about Here]
The second and third columns in Table 8 compare the purchase probabilities using original parameter estimates with those generated by counterfactual simulation; from this we can understand the extent to which compatibility changes purchase probabilities of base products. The results suggest if 
Partial Compatibility
The first simulation shows that Sony's proprietary standard of memory card (Standard 1) exerts strong pressure on the market share of Standard 3 memory cards. One defending strategy for Standard 3 might be to create an adapter that allows its compatible cameras to read Standard 1 cards. By this means, Kodak, Canon, HP, and Nikon can break down the lock-in effect of Sony's memory card, thus making their cameras more attractive. More specifically, we allow all cameras that are compatible with Standard 3 memory cards, i.e. Kodak, Canon, HP and Nikon, to be compatible with Standard 1 memory cards. Therefore, we increase the size of the choice set from 18 to 22 by adding four new choice alternatives, , š = (4,1), (5,1), (6,1), (7,1) , because under this situation Kodak (c=4), Canon (c=5), HP (c=6), and Nikon (c=7) can use the Sony Memory Stick (m=1). Moreover, the addon-to-base effect term is modified accordingly because Sony, Kodak, Canon, HP, and Nikon are now all compatible with a Standard 1 memory card. So in the occasion of purchasing any of these five cameras, a Standard 1 memory card in inventory will contribute to utility through the add-on-to-base effect term.
Our simulation result reported in the second and fourth column shows that all Standard 3 cameras can steal market share from Sony cameras. For example, Kodak can increase its market share by 3.54 percentage points and Canon can increase sales by 2.02 percentage points. This is because Sony memory cards can be used with a third group of cameras, thus avoiding Sony's add-on-to-base effect.
Consequently, the market share of Olympus and Fujifilm is smaller because of the added choice alternatives leading to more fierce competition in the market.
Alternative Dynamic Pricing Strategies
As mentioned in the data description session, Olympus and Fujifilm employed a pricing strategy for cameras that was high in the first two years (2000 and 2001) and lowered later. The consequence of such pricing is that consumers delay purchase. The low sales and hence fewer inventory of memory cards during the first two years did not help these brands harvest the add-on-to-base effect. An opposite strategy would be to start with a low price to attract consumers in purchasing both the camera and memory cards and later exploit the high add-on-to-base effect from consumers' high inventory of memory cards by upping prices.
In the next policy simulation, we allow the prices of Olympus and Fujifilm to keep falling by 10% each quarter during the first two years and then increase by 1% each quarter from 2002 to 2004.
Comparing the second and fifth columns of Table 8 shows that under the new pricing scheme, the market share of Olympus and Fujifilm cameras would increase by 3.33 percentage points and 1.17 percentage points, respectively. Correspondingly, the overall market share of Standard 2 memory cards would rise by 1.91 percentage points.
Olympus's initial low price triggers consumers to adopt the camera early and enjoy the stream of utility from the camera and memory cards onwards. With Standard 2 memory card in hand, consumers are also more willing to buy Olympus cameras in later periods. In summary, we can think of this new pricing policy as one that is more consistent with penetration pricing and product line pricing, where lower initial prices boost camera and hence memory card sales. This increase for memory cards permits the manufacture of cameras to generate higher consumer dynamic add-on-tobase effect and lock in consumers to purchases of compatible cameras in later periods.
Incompatibility and Brand Equity
Recall in section 5.2 that Sony has the largest brand-intrinsic preference, or in other words, the strongest brand equity in the camera market. Such lays the foundation for its success. If its brand equity were not as strong, the aid of the add-on-to-base effect stemming from incompatibility might be marginalized and thus have less influence on the market for base products. So we find it necessary to examine how brand equity and incompatibility are related. Does strong brand equity lead to greater or lesser impact from incompatibility between base and add-on products? We run a series of policy simulations where Sony's brand-specific intercept is set to that of the brand that ranks 2 nd to 7 th in the market. We compare the market share of Sony before and after eliminating incompatibility between memory cards and cameras (as done in section 6.1). Figure 5 depicts how the effect of incompatibility varies with Sony's brand equity rank. As we can see, when Sony had the strongest brand equity, creating incompatibility with other standards had a significant impact on its market share  a decrease of 7.04
percentage points. This effect of incompatibility diminishes as Sony's brand equity advantage vanishes (from rank 1 to rank 4). Strikingly, when Sony's brand equity falls below the industry average (rank 5 to 
Conclusions and Future Research
High-technology durable products often comprise base products and add-ons. When making purchase decisions, forward-looking consumers take into account price, quality, and compatibility and make joint inter-temporal decisions. This paper provides a framework to explicitly model consumer brand and standard choices of base and add-on products and investigate the dynamic dependence between two product categories, when multiple standards exist. Distinguishing ourselves from prior literature, which accounts for complementarity between product categories with a time-invariant constant term, we allow forward-looking consumers to endogenize the purchase quantity of memory cards and to consider the inventory of their memory cards when determining the purchase of base and add-on products. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to incorporate the cross-category pricing and the cross-category dynamic inventory trade-offs simultaneously. Furthermore, our analysis is at brand and standard level, which enables us to calibrate cross-brand, cross-standard, and cross-category price elasticity and compare the relative magnitude of each. Once given these elasticities, we further examined consumers' switching propensity in brand and standard, as well as interdependence across categories. Our results enrich the current literature by further probing competition at the standard and category level.
We found the dynamic add-on-to-base effect locks-in consumers to the base product brand and becomes stronger with greater inventory levels of add-ons. Among three standards, Sony's Memory Stick enjoys the highest add-on-to-base effect, which further leads to highest cost of switching and greatest lock-in effect. Following this, we demonstrated that Sony gained profits from developing its proprietary standard of memory card (the Memory Stick). We also found such a strategy might not be as profitable for a manufacturer with lower brand equity. On the other hand, we showed that when making a purchase decision for the base product, consumers take into account future prices of the addon product because the financial commitment is related to the planned purchase sequence of both categories. Furthermore, the dynamic add-on-to-base effect can be enhanced by lower future prices of 탰Ҟ add-ons. For example, if Standard 2 drops its initial price of memory cards, consumers will be triggered to adopt the camera early and the market size of Olympus will be expanded.
Insights from this stream of research will offer managers more comprehensive product strategies. For example, managers can employ pricing and promotion strategies for add-ons to improve base product market performance by taking advantage of the cross-category pricing effect and crosscategory dynamic inventory effect. A cheaper price of add-ons in the early period of new product introduction may encourage adoption and lock consumers in. On the other hand, market leaders may consider designing exclusive add-ons, which can lead to greater market share of the base product.
Followers though should elect to either be compatible with the leading brand or create a union with other players in the market to diminish the market power of the leading brand. Furthermore, pricing or promotion strategies of add-ons should be targeted heavily at price-sensitive consumers than qualitysensitive consumers.
Our research is subject to limitations that open areas for future research. First, with lacking product attributes in our data, we can't estimate intrinsic preference for various models of cameras and memory cards in a more refined fashion. Future works can further examine whether the documented add-on-to-base effect is more prominent for a high-end product or low-end product. Second, the current paper assumes price and quality are exogenously given. A very interesting topic to explore is how firms design the full product line by deciding price trajectories for both base products and add-ons taking consumers' dynamic decision-making processes into consideration. A full equilibrium model is needed to solve this problem from both sides of supply and demand. Third, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) reveal a very interesting phenomenon regarding base product and add-ons where firms shroud information about add-ons to consumers. Only sophisticated consumers take advantage of the firm that shrouds information by avoiding add-on purchases; the unsophisticated fall into the trap of high addon prices. Our paper supports the decision-making process of sophisticated consumers with evidence of their consideration of base products and add-ons at the same time. Future research can modify our model to allow only part of the consumers to be forward-looking with the rest short-sighted. Fourth, we keep other firm strategies, for example product design, pricing, cost structure, exogenous. But in reality, making add-on products compatible with base products involves engineering design, which will affect other firm decisions as well. 
Appendix 1
Digital cameras became available to common consumers on February 17, 1994, when Apple, the creator of the Macintosh computer, introduced the Quick Take 100, a color digital camera with a 640x480 pixels 14 . Later in 1994, Olympus, another leader in the camera industry, introduced their Deltis VC-1100, the world's first digital camera with built-in transmission capabilities, allowing users to connect to a modem and upload digital photos over cellular and analog phone lines to another camera or a computer. Other pioneers in the market include the Kodak DC40 camera (March 28, 1995) , the Casio QV-11 (with LCD monitor, late 1995), and Sony's Cyber-Shot Digital Still Camera (1996) . Afterward, the industry saw a substantial boom of various models of digital cameras. The quality (measured by megapixels) of all brands of cameras gradually increased over time and there was no dominating brand of highest quality throughout the sample periods. The quality of memory cards (measured by megabytes) also rose as time went by. Standard 3 took a leading position until Standard 1 (Sony's Memory Stick) caught up after 2003. 
